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IS THINKING LIKE A LA WYER 
ENOUGH? 
Sallyanne Payton* 
We could actually train legal minds here -A Student 
Every year that I attend meetings of the Law School's Com: 
mittee of Visitors I ask members of the committee how the 
school might improve the training that we give to our graduates. 
Every year until this one the lawyers who have responded to this 
question have given a standard answer: the young lawyers are 
smart, they say, smarter in many respects than their seniors, but 
they don't know how to write well. This response usually leads 
to a discussion of the proper place of skills training in the law 
school curriculum; lawyers and professors engage in a little 
jousting over the relationship between theory and practice, and 
all together lament the literary deficiencies of law students, com-
pared, presumably, to ourselves. 
This year, however, when I asked the visitors how legal educa-
tion might be improved, I heard a new observation, one that 
strikes more plainly at the heart of the enterprise of legal educa-
tion. One of the visitors, a senior partner in a distinguished east-
ern law firm, remarked straightforwardly that his new people are 
competent enough at doing legal analysis, but lack judgment, in-
deed resist being asked to exercise judgment, when it comes to 
actually devising a course of action to recommend to a client. 
Other visitors listening to the answer nodded agreement. 
Lack of judgment? Is that not the standard complaint of the 
mature against the young, even the talented young? Is not judg-
ment exactly the quality that is acquired through experience 
and reflection-in practice? Should not the humility and reti-
cence of recent graduates be regarded as a virtue rather than a 
defect, in light of the legendary brashness of youth? In any 
event, is it not reasonable to assume that the judgment problem, 
if there is one, will just work itself out over time? Should the law 
schools take to heart this kind of criticism? 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A., 1964, LL.B., 1968, Stanford 
University. 
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It would be tempting to say that training young lawyers to 
have judgment is not the bailiwick of the law schools, just as 
intensive skills training is not; but a suggestion that a lawyer 
lacks judgment amounts to an accusation of professional incom-
petence, which surely reflects, even at some remove, on the qual-
ity of his or her training. The central purpose of formal legal 
education should be to equip young graduates with the tech-
niques of inquiry and reasoning that make them fast learners, 
persons to whom professional responsibility comes naturally and 
in whom sound judgment develops without strain. Although it 
has traditionally been understood that even the most academi-
cally talented beginning lawyers must rely on their first employ-
ers to provide the apprenticeship that makes them fit to re-
present actual clients, it has been assumed that the drill in case 
analysis that is the heart of legal education bestows the basic 
cognitive tools that young lawyers need in order to learn quickly 
on the job. 
Viewed against this history, the visitor's observation is troub-
ling, because it hints that the standards by which young lawyers 
are judged by their employers may be becoming less generous. 
This may seem a large speculation to found on a random re-
mark, but the remark fits all too well the emerging competitive 
reality of law practice. It is only to be expected that lawyers who 
themselves must meet increasingly stringent market tests will 
have less time to teach, less time to provide feedback, and less 
patience than was the case in more leisurely and prosperous . 
times.1 · 
At the same time, the coJJ.ditions of advancement within law 
firms are likely to become more complicated. Law firms are be-
coming large complex organizations. During the last decade a 
large number of firms have grown to have more than 150 law-
yers; it has become common for the largest firms to have offices 
in several cities. The path to success in these enterprises is un-
charted; however, some strains and contradictions are already 
becoming apparent. The very size of the firms points toward in-
creasing routinization of tasks and standardization of product, 
implying specialization, hierarchy, and internal dynamics of the 
sort associated with bureaucracy; yet a consulting law firm sur-
vives only by the personal entrepreneurship of its lawyers. 
Young lawyers may thus find that by the time of the partnership 
1. For a parallel observation, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR AssocIA-
TION COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE 
OF LAWYERS 77 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS]. 
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decision they are expected to have achieved an ideal combina-
tion of technical mastery, professional judgment, success within 
the organization itself, and ability to attract and retain clients. 
The fulcrum on which all these evaluations must turn is whether 
the lawyer has good judgment, which is the foundation of other 
professional virtues. 
Viewed in this light, standard legal education appears prob-
lematic. Law schools do not convey to the students vividly 
enough the truth that an intellectually disciplined astuteness 
about institutions and people contributes as much to the actual 
craft of lawyering as does the ability to do technically sound le-
gal reasoning. In fact, the latent message of the instructional 
program may be that the hallmark of the lawyerly mind is pre-
cisely its singleminded focus on the law and legal issues-that is, 
on those issues that may be the occasion for litigation-to the 
exclusion of all else. 2 What is not conveyed with sufficient clarity 
is the fact that the lawyer must be engaged intellectually with 
the world in order to appreciate what legal issues may arise and 
how they might be dealt with. We might improve legal educa-
tion, then, by giving students more opportunity to exercise their 
reasoning abilities in contexts that allow them to understand 
how the specific skill of "thinking like a lawyer" fits into what 
one student of practicing professionals has called the "reflective 
conversation with the situation"3 that is the larger task of active 
lawyering. While we cannot teach students to exercise the arts of 
the practicing lawyer, we could do more to help them develop 
the wider range of thinking skills that they must exercise as 
lawyers. 
In the process, we might do well to take a harder look at just 
what happens to students intellectually while they are in law 
school. Consider the mental skills and mindsets that are charac-
teristically induced by law school training. First, there is the ab-
sorption with courts, specifically the appellate courts. Relentless 
exposure to appellate opinions has the beneficial effect, much 
like intensive language training, of giving students an opportu-
nity to acquire a feel for the rhythms and cadences of the con-
versations in which they will later participate. However, missing 
from the texts is a sense of what that actual conversation is like, 
how the parties shape the discourse. The judicial opinions do 
2. See Van Valkenburg, Law Teachers, Law Students, and Litigation, 34 J. LEGAL 
Enuc. 584, 597-99 (1984). 
3. See D. ScHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN Ac-
TION (1983). 
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not convey a vision of the lawyer, or for that matter the judge, 
as a storyteller, creating legal stories from the raw stuff of actual 
disputes, sculpting arguments from texts, making usable history 
in the process of fashioning "precedent" out of prior cases. A 
good law teacher will of course reach around the appellate opin-
ion to encourage students to imagine the parties, the transac-
tion, the actual dispute, the process;• but the time available for 
such speculation is limited and the supply of suitable materials 
sparse. By default of critical views and alternative sources of in-
formation, therefore, the student may come to accept the ver-
sions of reality that are placed before him every day by the au-
thorities even though in theory he knows that there is something 
more to these documents than meets the eye. Indeed, a certain 
willingness simply to absorb the judicial view is functional, since 
the student must train himself or herself to see the world as 
judges see it in order to anticipate correctly how judges will be-
have. One must learn the language of judicial discourse, even if 
it means putting aside one's own world view. 
The further sacrifice that one makes in the first year, from 
which one may never recover, is the sacrifice of one's common 
sense, or general intelligence. Indeed, it is essential in the first 
year of law school to separate the students from their unexam-
ined views and values, in the interests of inculcating habits of 
analytic rigor. I suppose that we assume that there will be time 
later for the students to recover what is valuable of their old 
selves and to integrate their previous lives with their lives as 
lawyers; but the institution gives them little enough encourage-
ment or opportunity to do so, and very little indication of how 
that task can be accomplished consistent with the professional 
detachment that is induced in the first year. These are not insig-
nificant sacrifices: not every profession requires its practitioners 
to relinquish so much of themselves in order to undergo basic 
professional socialization. The payoff is supposed to be that one 
emerges from the first year having acquired the widely touted 
skill of "thinking like a lawyer." 
• The consensus of generations of lawyers is that the person 
who has actually learned to think like a lawyer and who has 
used his or her legal education as a window onto the world has 
developed a set of thinking skills that can be turned to any prac-
tical intellectual task with impressive results. Certainly my own 
observations are consistent with the collective wisdom. Whether 
4. There is no more eloquent affirmation of the teacher's role in doing just this than 
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930). 
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law schools are entitled to claim the most versatile members of 
the profession as representative, however, is questionable. I 
would think that the true measure of -law training is the impact 
that it has on the thinking apparatus of the middling student 
who wants only to get reasonably good grades in law school and 
to acquire what preparation he or she can for the conventional 
private practice of law. Viewed from this perspective, it must be 
pointed out that the effects of a legal education may not be 
wholly salutary. One can graduate from law school not quite 
having acquired the full benefit of skill in legal analysis5 but 
having had one's spirits and general intelligence depressed and 
one's vision narrowed. It may take one some time to recover 
from legal education. 
The folklore is otherwise. Past successes of the legal profes-
sion have given legal educators reason to believe that the skill of 
"thinking like a lawyer" fits comfortably into general intelli-
gence, indeed may even augment that intelligence with analyti-
cal skills of special sharpness. In their more grandiose moments, 
enthusiasts of legal education6 -law school deans, for exam-
ple-may even claim that lawyers are smarter than other kinds 
of people, better at solving problems, more to be entrusted with 
matters of importance, omnicompetent. And in real life most law 
graduates have learned to use the kind of judgment that is exer-
cised routinely by intelligent people doing tasks at which they 
plan to succeed. 
This intellectual integration has historically been achieved, 
however, not during formal schooling but during the first years 
of practice. There is therefore cause to worry. If the quality of 
the average apprenticeship yields to the galloping commerciali-
zation of law practice, law schools may have to take on more 
responsibility for educating students to exercise professional in-
telligence. Even the major firms are asking for students who can 
"write better," by which they plainly mean that they want grad-
uates who can not only construct a paragraph but also shape an 
argument. There is also a growing demand for more clinical edu-
cation and skills training, which can be understood as a response 
to the perception that entering lawyers need more systematic in-
struction in basic practice skills, particularly if they are not 
likely to have the benefit of an apprenticeship. Although the law 
5. See Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 479 
(1984). 
6. For an unusual twist to the argument, see Llewellyn, The Crafts of Law Re• Val-
ued, 15 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 1 (1942), reprinted in K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 316 
(1962). 
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schools' responses to demands for expensive training of this sort 
have been deliberate, the current weight of informed opinion 
certainly leans toward accommodating the demand in a manner 
consistent with the institutions' basic academic mission. 
My own reason for favoring such programs, however, is not 
that they enhance students' technical competence as lawyers, 
but that they engage the students' general intelligence in the do-
ing of tasks in which the students are responsible for outcomes. 
In clinical and skills courses, students must engage in a continu-
ous process of thinking and learning from their own activity, in-
tegrating intellect with performance, theory with practice. The 
most beneficial of such courses are those that combine active 
learning with organized instruction to help students gain sys-
tematic, theoretical understanding of why some actions succeed 
and others fail;7 but even if the courses do not off er much in the 
way of theory they can provide opportunities for students to use 
their own heads and exercise their own courage. 
Perhaps I should make it clear here that I am hunting small 
game. This is not a radical critique of the legal profession, nor a 
proposal for wholesale reform of legal education. I assume that 
most students of this and other major law schools will continue 
to find employment with law firms or conventional public sector 
institutions and that the students desire mainly to be regarded 
upon entry into their jobs as good technical lawyers with ade-
quate general judgment. The kinds of deficiencies in lawyers' 
training that I am focusing on are, therefore, those that may 
lead to inadequate representation of clients, including regular 
commercial clients. They may also lead to other objectionable 
behaviors, but those are beyond the scope of this essay. 
My thesis here is that formal legal education, in addition to 
being by no means an education in lawyering, affirmatively in-
culcates in law students a characteristic pattern of blind spots 
that a good lawyer must overcome if he or she is to represent 
clients competently, assuming that the goal is to serve clients 
and not to exploit them (exploitation being one of the topics 
that is beyond the scope of this essay). Examples of inadequate 
lawyering are not difficult to find; I shall use only two (real) 
anecdotes for illustration. Both were told to me by the clients, 
who fortunately knew better than their counsel. The first exam-
ple is that of the lawyer who, being unaware of the existence of 
the California Coastal Commission, advised his client to take ad-
7. See Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LE-
GAL Eouc. 612 (1984). 
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vantage of an apparent bargain price on a piece of undeveloped 
real estate fronting on the Pacific Ocean just south of Big Sur. 
The second example is that of the lawyer who, not bothering to 
find out that his client's financial stability depended on the con-
tinued patronage of a large firm with a wide choice of suppliers, 
attempted to persuade the client to sue that firm over a contract 
dispute arising out of a minor transaction. 
Lawyers in good firms would probably doubt even the basic 
competence of lawyers who made such errors; however, mistakes 
of judgment of this kind ought not be regarded merely as ran-
dom failures, personal to the lawyers involved. They are errors 
of a certain type, symptomatic of the style of analysis that is 
affirmatively taught in law school. Take the example of the law-
yer who did not know about the California regulatory scheme. 
As a student the lawyer would have had the standard course in 
property law, in which he would have learned a little about land 
use regulation, probably through reading appellate judicial opin-
ions involving constitutional challenges to local zoning ordi-
nances. Most of his property course, however, would have been 
taken up with the study of private-law doctrines. So, for that 
matter, would have been most other first-year courses in which 
the substantive "law" that is studied has been established 
mainly by courts settling disputes among private parties. Other 
kinds of law being off to one side in the law school courses, it is 
too easy to inf er that they are also off to one side in life. The 
first-year "law" curriculum does not condition students to think 
instinctively of statutes and regulations as sources of law, nor 
alert them to the fact that public law systems blanket the legal 
landscape and are responsible for many arrangements that the 
students may take for granted in the social order. Although the 
students' mental model of the lawmaking system may be cor-
rected later either in law school or in practice as they gain expo-
sure to or experience in public law areas, the unexamined basic 
model acquired during that crucial first year of law school may 
remain latent, with the potential to induce error, sometimes dra-
matic error, as the example suggests. 
The second example, that of the lawyer who advises his client 
to invoke the judicial process inappropriately in the contract 
dispute, exemplifies another characteristic intellectual failure of 
lawyers that must be blamed on legal education. In the context 
of the law school classroom, students are trained to narrow their 
vision, to see legal issues rather than disputing persons. Al-
though it is essential to curb the students' responses to the iden-
tities of the disputing parties or their actual relationships to one 
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another where such matters are legally irrelevant, the hazard is 
that successful law students may acquire a disciplined habit of 
disregarding the human or transactional contexts of legal dis-
putes, a habit that must be unlearned in practice. 
Some of these undesirable effects of legal education can be 
counteracted while the students are still in school. For example, 
in order to accustom students to the use of non-judicial sources 
of law we might introduce more statutory material into the first-
year curriculum, and use as examples of reasoned decisionmak-
ing the opinions of non-judicial bodies such as administrative 
agencies, whose output is often of a higher intellectual quality 
than that of the judiciary. It would be useful, in other words, to 
introduce first year students to something like the full range of 
legal texts that they will have to be able to use as lawyers, as a 
way of keeping before their eyes the full range of lawmaking in-
stitutions of which they need to be aware. 
Simply teaching students about public law would not, how-
ever, cure the more pervasive deficit in legal education, which is 
the almost entire lack of training in or even exposure to the ex-
ercise of situational judgment. Such judgment cannot be taught; 
but formal education can lay the intellectual foundations for its 
exercise. It is therefore appropriate to ask whether the particular 
objects on which the lawyers' practical intelligence must be en-
gaged are susceptible to being understood systematically and 
can be explored in a classroom format. 
Asking the question points out, however, how little we know 
about what practicing lawyers do, or how they evaluate profes-
sional competence. The vocabulary in which peer judgments are 
made is underdeveloped and unstandardized; and it is probably 
the case that what good lawyers recognize in one another is a 
quality of mind rather than mastery of some set of specific tech-
nical skills or subject matters. If as law teachers we were to take 
seriously the task of growing good legal minds, we might do well 
to identify and foster deliberately the development of the 
mental qualities that good lawyers regard as indicators of high 
professional ability in other lawyers.8 
Some of these qualities are not difficult to identify, and per-
haps to stimulate through formal education.9 One such quality is 
8. My suggestion echoes that of former Dean Bayless Manning. See ENHANCING THE 
COMPETENCE or LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 417, 432-33 (address of Bayless A. Manning). 
9. I am assuming, somewhat against the evidence, that the traditional law school 
courses are doing an adequate job of teaching legal analysis. While this kind of core 
training could be improved vastly, the problems of the core curriculum are beyond the 
scope of this essay. 
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peripheral vision, an ability to perceive what is going on in the 
total environment, to understand how things connect. Lawyers 
with well-developed peripheral vision can be awesome in their 
ability to look at problems from many different perspectives, to 
see not only what is presented but what is not presented, to 
think across doctrinal categories, to spot threat or opportunity 
originating from outside of what seem to be the boundaries of a 
problem. Another outstanding quality of good lawyers is an abil-
ity and willingness to appreciate a client's problem in the full 
context in which the client experiences it. A third, which is less a 
quality than a capability, is an ability to design successful 
courses of action that accomplish the client's legal objective in a 
satisfactory manner in the context of the client's total situation. 
To a substantial extent the talent that underlies these abilities 
is simply that of being a fast learner. Good lawyers are quick 
studies. But even learning is learned behavior-that is, we learn 
to think. It therefore ought to be possible to help law students 
acquire mental habits that will enable them to learn quickly and 
systematically from experience. There are two points to be made 
here, both of which derive from the fact that fast learning is 
based on pattern recognition. The first is that some of what law-
yers need to know about the world can actually be taught in law 
school. In light of the quantity of academic energy that has been 
devoted over the past several decades to the study of major in-
stitutions and social sytems, it is not necessary for students to 
go out into the world of commercial law practice knowing noth-
ing about, for example, the banking system, or the telecommuni-
cations system, or the systems through which energy and natural 
resources are brought into the economy and distributed; nor is it 
necessary for students to enter worlds based on standard social 
institutions such as private ordering through contract without 
the benefit of the systematic insights into contracting behavior 
now available in the scholarly literature. Even students who can 
learn rapidly on their own can profit from being given a disci-
plined analytical framework on which to hang their own insights, 
or against which to test their own learning. The second point to 
be made is that quite apart from any specific information that 
might· be taught, law schools would do well to encourage stu-
dents to develop habits of systematic iriquiry into and analytical 
thought about subjects other than legal doctrine. The sooner the 
student is exposed to the need to act in the wider world the 
sooner he or she will realize that there is considerable profes-
sional payoff to having the intelligence "on" at all times. 
It should be clear by now that I am suggesting that we add a 
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different sort of learning to the law school curriculum, one that 
helps the lawyer exercise his or her role not mainly as lawyer but 
as smart generalist, as counselor, problem-solver, and transac-
tion builder. These tasks are at the heart of many lawyers' prac-
tices but they are tasks for which lawyers receive no training, 
and in which lawyers have no particular comparative advan-
tage.10 For the task of putting together a major business deal, for 
example, there may be little intrinsic reason to prefer a smart 
lawyer to a smart person trained in management or finance, par-
ticularly if the strictly legal aspects of the transaction are not its 
most complicated or problematic. Historically, law firms have 
claimed this type of work because they could plausibly maintain 
that the skill of legal analysis made lawyers better than other 
professionals at managing difficult and complex problems that 
cut across disciplinary lines. Partly for this reason, partly be-
cause law has always been a path to public service, the law de-
gree has for the past half-century been the credential of choice 
for the intelligent, ambitious generalist, who could be reasonably 
assured that armed with a lawyer's mind he could find his way 
to the most interesting problems in any field that he touched. 
Relative to this tradition, however, some of the changes in the 
structure of the legal profession ought to be read as warning 
signs. The prospect of law practice in the gargantuan multicity 
law firms that have risen in recent years may be less attractive 
to the adventurous mind than were the prospects for practice in 
even the largest law firm of two decades ago. Law firms may 
come to be challenged in their transaction-making function by 
other entities such as management firms or multidisciplinary or-
ganizations, in which lawyers are members of professional teams 
that may be headed by persons with other backgrounds. Some of 
the creative generalist side of lawyers' business may shift to 
other types of generalist professionals. Since very bright young 
people can be expected to seek the degree that will lead them to 
where they think the action will be, any shift away from law as 
the center of action in the real world must have a negative effect 
on law schools' ability to attract the most promising lights of 
rising generations. 
What do I suggest? Not, for the moment, a wholesale revision 
of the law school curriculum, although I think it likely that sub-
stantial changes may finally prove inescapable under the press 
of outside challenge. In the short term, the kind of improve-
10. For an elaboration of this theme, see Gilson, Value Creation by Business Law-
yers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 241, 294-313 (1984). 
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ments that I am advocating can be accommodated by the tradi-
tional device of inserting into the curriculum some additional 
second- and third-year elective courses, designed however on a 
new principle. That principle is that the training of lawyers in-
cludes the systematic study of the organizations and institutions 
that populate the working lawyer's actual environment-not the 
"law" governing them, but the things themselves. Why institu-
tions? Because the study of organizations and institutions really 
is the path to understanding how the contemporary world works. 
This is not an exotic suggestion, only a bow in the direction of 
acknowledging the realities of contemporary law practice. Most 
lawyers spend most of their professional lives dealing with orga-
nizations and persons playing organizational roles-representing 
them, putting together deals for them, arguing or bargaining 
with them, or litigating against them. For the majority of our 
students who intend to have careers as outside counsel to busi-
ness firms, "the client" who must be satisfied is likely to be a 
particular corporate manager or inside lawyer whose perception 
of the value of the consulting lawyer's services, or of the quality 
of the lawyer's judgment and advice, may hinge in large part on 
how usefully the outside lawyer complements the insider's own 
role within the organization. Some lawyers live in worlds in 
which virtually all the actors are members of complex 
organizations. 
Legal education presently provides students with virtually no 
understanding of organizations and of the behavior of persons 
acting within or on behalf of organizations. Organizations are 
discussed mainly as juridicial entities, seen from the outside 
through the eyes .of courts or legislatures. In nearly all law con-
texts except those in which we are specifically trying to decide 
whether to hold an organization responsible for the acts of its 
agents, we speak of governments or of corporations as though 
the actual actors were the corporate entities, not the people 
within them, and as though the organizations worked on a com-
mand-and-control model of internal governance.11 We thus ig-
nore much of the real complexity of organizational behavior. 
The practical effect is to leave students with an incorrect mental 
model of the actual world of organizations that they will encoun-
ter as lawyers, a model that they will have to lay aside in order 
to function intelligently. The current fashion of bringing 
microeconomics into the law school classroom only compounds 
11. For further discussion, see Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Con-
trol of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980). 
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this problem, since most microeconomic theory treats the busi-
ness firm as a singleminded profit-maximizer, a construct that is 
controverted by nearly all students of actual business behavior. 
Insight into the behavior of individual organizations needs to 
be coupled with insight into how the total system functions. Stu-
dents graduate in ignorance even of the legal system. It seems 
odd that law students gain in their ordinary courses virtually no 
systems-level insight into the workings of official lawmaking in-
stitutions and the relationship between law of all types and pri-
vate ordering. For example, despite the fact that American law 
is virtually incomprehensible withou_t, some appreciation of the 
complexities of the federal system, law students typically do not 
even learn enough about federalism or the separation of powers 
in government to be able to give a comprehensible explanation 
of the theoretical underpinnings of the American system of gov-
ernment to a group of high school students. Law schools even 
teach them little or nothing about the active functioning of the 
court system viewed as a system, and naturally nothing about 
how courts work as institutions. When it comes to non-judicial 
public ordering law students are typically helpless: they regu-
larly enter the practice of law knowing nothing of the workings 
of non-judicial official lawmaking institutions such as legisla-
tures and administrative agencies and so little about constitu-
tional structure that they would not know where to begin in 
drafting a set of by-laws for a voluntary organization, much less 
a charter for a government. On the side of private ordering, law-
yers characteristically are unfamiliar with the inner workings of 
the numerous private governments that control items of high 
economic value such as institutional accreditations, sports 
franchises, professional certifications, and seats on stock ex-
changes. And ironically in view of the fact that many of our stu-
dents intend to become the plumbers and electricians, even the 
architects and builders, of the capitalist order, they learn little 
of how capitalism works, or of the organization of industry, or of 
the relationship between business and the state. 
It can of course be argued that smart people catch on to how 
the world works once they enter practice. That is true to a point, 
indeed has always been the case. However, the type of learning 
that occurs in any active setting tends toward the anecdo-
tal-that is, a lawyer may achieve specialized mastery of a par-
ticular institutional terrain without ever achieving the kind of 
integrated understanding that makes knowledge transferable. 
There is therefore reason to acquire understanding of basic 
structures while one has leisure to do so, in order to know what 
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questions to ask when one finds oneself in unfamiliar territory. 
Systems-level understanding is what gives good lawyers their re-
sourcefulness and peripheral vision, their feel for context, their 
ability to anticipate the full range of legal issues and arguments 
that might be available to a client and to understand how a cli-
ent's cause should be positioned to enhance the likelihood of 
favorable outcomes. 
It can be argued that I am echoing the traditional urging that 
law school become a form of education in the liberal arts, includ-
ing the liberal art of governance, and I think that would be a fair 
characterization of my position. However, my main concern is 
for the development of competent professional minds; and that 
sets some limits both on what I would try to teach and how I 
would try to teach it. The beginning of wisdom in this area is 
probably that what needs to be known cannot be taught, at least 
not to the young. Aristotle pointed out that one cannot appreci-
ate lectures on political science unless one is "versed in the prac-
tical business of life from which politics draws its premises and 
subject-matter."12 The same observation applies to lawyering: 
one cannot be taught it until one has done it. And neither can a 
person learn in the classroom all that he or she will ultimately 
need to know about the systems through which our collective 
lives are <;>rdered. 
What we can do, however, is to introduce students to the tra-
ditions, ideas, and styles of thinking that are embedded in vari-
ous institutions. I would be more interested in enhancing stu-
dents' repertoires of thinking styles than their stores of 
information. What is important is to introduce law students to 
the ways in which the people who manage the non-judicial insti-
tutions think, how they use information, how they regard incen-
tives and assess risks, how they view themselves in their own 
environments. 
Here we come back to the main theme of this essay, which is 
the problem of ensuring that the law school experience promotes 
rather than hinders the process of developing good professional 
judgment. At the point at which students graduate from law 
school they ought to be able to think, not just "think like law-
yers"; the way to get them into the habit of thinking is to intro-
duce them to responsible, purposive reasoning wherever 
possible. 
The key adjective is "purposive." Nearly all institutional 
12. THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.A.K. Thomson trans. 
1953, H. Trednnick rev. trans. 1976). 
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thinking is done with some purpose in mind. Business corpora-
tions, private voluntary associations, and government adminis-
trative agencies engage in willed, deliberate action directed to-
ward the achievement of ends that are explicit and often 
measurable. A business sets out to develop and market a prod-
uct; a sorority sets out to build a complicated national network 
of membership organizations; the federal Environmental Protec-
tion Agency sets out to give the nation clean air; the local park 
and planning commission sets out to create an integrated system 
of parks. In each case, the organization must acquire, usually 
through its own resources, the information it thinks it needs in 
order to act; it must devise a plan of action; it must reach stable 
agreements over ends and means with those who have the power 
to obstruct or delay action; it must take action or achieve a cor-
rect blend of action and inaction; and it must be judged on the 
results. In both the private and public sectors, organizations 
with purposes must achieve a proper fit between ends, means, 
and resources if they wish to succeed on the terms in which their 
success is measured. 
When we speak of a purposive decisionmaker as having "judg-
ment" we really mean to say that he or she has an ability to see 
the likely future consequences of present actions; this kind of 
judgment translates into an ability to design and implement suc-
cessful courses of action. When we speak of a lawyer as having 
"judgment" we mean much the same thing. Considered as actors 
in the world, lawyers are purposive decisionmakers who have a 
great deal more in common with other purposive decisionmakers 
than with the courts, which are decisionmakers with authority 
but not purposes. One reason for putting law students in contact 
with competent purposive reasoning therefore, is to expose them 
to good models of the kind of thinking they will have to do 
themselves. 
Law students who spend their professionally formative years 
studying appellate decisions may gain a peculiar view of how 
competent thinking is done. Courts are not purposive institu-
tions, and consequently judges are unusual among mature deci-
sionmakers. The judiciary does not, or at any rate claims that it 
does not, set out to achieve goals other than those of deciding 
the cases that come before the courts in accordance with correct 
legal principles appropriately ordered. Nor do judges behave as 
though they had institutional purposes. The law moves forward 
on the individual case. I do not mean to deny that some individ-
ual judges have coherently purposive agendas, nor to imply that 
judicial lawmaking is not informed by considerations of policy, 
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only that the judicial institution as a whole cannot be accused of 
having systematic objectives that it seeks to achieve in its devel-
opment of legal rules. Certainly the judicial branches of the fifty 
state governments do not set out for themselves purposes and 
protocols for designing systems of laws. It is nearly inconceiv-
able, for example, that a state supreme court might issue direc-
tives to the lower courts instructing them on how to decide tort 
cases in a manner that contributes to reducing the incidence of 
drunk driving. 
In addition to not having explicit purposes, courts do not set 
their own agendas nor gather information with respect to the 
disputes that come before them, but rather must rely on the 
parties to define the issues and to come forward with informa-
tion that meets judicial standards. Courts also have institutional 
autonomy, constitutionally conferred: they do not have to nego-
tiate in advance with other institutions or with the public over 
what to do in a particular case or in a line of cases, having only 
to defend themselves against post hoc criticism. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, courts do not for the most part even 
know what happens to disputes or parties after the case has en-
ded, and would be shocked to be evaluated on the "success or 
failure" of their legal principles. 
Judicial reasoning is consequently a special type of reasoning, 
designed almost exclusively around the tasks of dispute resolu-
tion, more akin to moral philosophy than to management. Pur-
posive decisionmaking, by contrast, is generally concerned with 
prospective action, therefore with uncertainty, risk, and conse-
quence, and with the ordering of principles under pressure; the 
decisionmaker is generally less concerned with "applying stan-
dards" or "weighing evidence" than with projecting and predict-
ing. I do not mean to suggest that purposive decisionmakers are 
superior to judicial decisionmakers, only different from them. I 
do suggest, however, that without some appreciation of purpo-
sive decisionmaking it is very difficult to understand what is go-
ing on in the world or to participate intelligently in shaping 
action. 
This set of perceptions leads me to suggest that law students 
ought to be exposed to courses the subject matter of which is an 
institution or set of institutions (e.g., financial institutions or 
hospitals) studied as a system of ordering in its own right and 
not simply as the fodder for judicial analysis. Let me make some 
suggestions for course design based on areas with which I am 
familiar. A course on health law is an appropriate forum for an 
institutional approach, since the health care sector is governed 
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through an elaborate network of interrelated private associations 
and public agencies that accredit institutions, credential prof es-
sionals, allocate hospital staff privileges, · set standards of prac-
tice, insure patients against medical expenses, and the like. The 
health care arena also involves leading-edge issues of law in ar-
eas as diverse as antitrust and bioethics. 
There are two main methods of proceeding in designing a 
health law course. The first, which has been standard, has been 
to organize the course as an exploration of those areas in which 
courts have decided to make "law" to govern the behavior of 
health care providers.18 In such a course, hospitals, nurses, and 
doctors are seen through a set of vignettes narrated by judges. 
The vignettes may lead to judicial discussion of malpractice lia-
bility, or the allocation of hospital staff privileges, or price-fixing 
among doctors, or the like; but the topics selected for discussion 
are those that have found their way into appellate opinions. The 
health care institutions themselves are in the background. 
The other method of designing the course, which I prefer, is to 
approach the health care institutions as an interlocking system 
of private and quasi-public governments, with their own pur-
poses, intra-industry relationships, dispute resolution forums, 
and decisional standards. From this vantage point, health care 
providers' encounters with the judicial system are experiences 
with an external sovereign; judicial standards are foreign ele-
ments to which internal adjustments must be made. The institu-
tions' need to deal with judicially imposed medical malpractice 
liability, for example, relates to their internal management prob-
lem of assuring adequate medical quality control; and the ques-
tion to be asked about the current system of malpractice adjudi-
cation is whether it stimulates or retards the health care 
industry's own efforts to raise the quality of care. Likewise, the 
problem of health care financing and regulation through health 
insurance programs presents opportunities for students to think 
about designing and financing social programs that create incen-
tives for desired performance on the part of beneficiaries and 
providers. The question of how far courts should go in oversee-
ing the allocation of hospital staff privileges becomes an issue of 
epistemology as well as fairness: is it appropriate to ask medical 
people to translate their way of "knowing" whether a practi-
tioner delivers adequate quality care into lawyers' ways of 
"knowing" in order to comply with courts' notions of due pro-
13. See, e.g., W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE, AND FORENSIC SCIENCE (3d ed. 
1982). 
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cess or fair consideration? What is the strength of the legal prin-
ciple that would force wholesale judicialization of the staff allo-
cation process? 
The study of decisionmaking by nonjudicial institutions 
presents good opportunities for students also to learn about pur-
posive dispute resolution-that is, dispute resolution that is part 
of a process of management or governance, in which the most 
decisive considerations may be not the rights of the parties or 
the ordering of abstract principles considered apart from their 
consequences, but rather the degree to which various possible 
outcomes are likely to contribute to some purpose such as pre-
serving the health of an organization or an ongoing relationship 
between the parties. In the staff privilege area, the hospital staff 
is frequently called upon to decide not so much whether the doc-
tor seeking privileges is "qualified" but whether, knowing how 
he or she has performed in the past, the staff is confident of his 
or her ability to perform competently in the future, and to play 
the role within the institution that the institution desires. The 
problem is not one of applying standards but of predicting be-
havior, which is a different matter. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this kind of learning is 
the opportunity it provides for students to imagine themselves 
playing roles in decisionmaking under the normal conditions 
that obtain in nonjudicial settings, in which the information 
available to the decisionmaking process is less abundant in 
quantity and less circumscribed in type than the information 
typically made available to courts, and the decisionmaker must 
bear the cost of gathering the necessary information and the risk 
of making an erroneous decision on inadequate information. Fi-
nally, the study of decisionmaking in purposive institutions 
would help students to appreciate the difference between exer-
cising retrospective judgment, that is, allocating praise, blame, 
gain, or loss arising out of past actions, and exercising prospec-
tive judgment, that is, making predictions of future events and 
recommendations for future courses of action. 
At the bottom of all of this, my interest is in having law stu-
dents gain respect for the intelligence exercised by responsible 
persons who are not lawyers. Because the courts have the last 
word, and because the judgments they render are based on 
sometimes painstaking analysis of past events, it is too easy for 
law students who are immersed in court decisions to assume the 
role of critic. Legal analysis is characteristically negative and 
critical, sometimes in picayune respects, leading students to be-
lieve that the smartest person is the person who most success-
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fully identifies the defects in the other person's argument. Nega-
tive judgment taken at leisure without responsibility is, however, 
a great deal easier to exercise than positive judgment made 
under pressure with responsibility;14 law students see too much 
of the first and not nearly enough of the second, though much of 
the judgment that they themselves will have to exercise in their 
professional careers is of the second type. If I have a central pur-
pose in making these suggestions, it is to get law students out of 
their enforced passivity and into the mode of exercising active 
intelligence while they are still in law school. At least, we could 
start them more securely on the road to professional 
competence. 
14. See Wald, Thoughts on Decisionmaking, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1984). 
